Conspiracy Thinking in the Halls of Learning

Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: the New Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy

We’ve witnessed the ascension of conspiracy thinking to the pinnacles of American political power in the last decade or so. Specious narratives like birtherism, Pizzagate, and QAnon have progressed from cranky online bunkum, to serious political influences, to justification for violence, with remarkable speed. Many serious scholars and armchair pundits have tried their hands at explaining this perverse appeal. Most explanations have been ultimately unsatisfying.

PoliSci professors Muirhead and Rosenblum, from Dartmouth and Harvard respectively, examine this movement with a critical lens. They contrast today’s “new conspiracism” with traditional conspiracy theories, which attempt to construct self-contained narratives that remove all ambiguity and chance from life. The new conspiracism, by contrast, makes no attempts at explanation or narrative; it simply flings aspersions recklessly, unconcerned with the damage perpetrated on democracy and American life.

Unfortunately, while reading this book, I found myself reminded of sociologist Duncan J. Watts. Watts compares much contemporary social science with art history. Pressed to explain why the Mona Lisa is the best artwork ever, art historians will launch into florid accounts of Leonardo’s color, line, and composition. One needn’t listen long to realize that art historians, like political scientists, often claim to explain things, but in practice only describe.

Muirhead and Rosenblum explain extensively the characteristics they see in new conspiracism. Unlike, say, moon landing hoaxes or JFK assassination theories, famous for devotees poring extensively over minute details, today’s conspiracists basically abjure evidence. Faced with a reality they find unsatisfying, like a President getting elected on a technicality, they simply name-drop “fake news” or “alternative facts,” and consider their contribution basically done.

Our authors use extensive technical language to describe these phenomena. New conspiracism has a “low epistemic bar,” meaning one’s standards for judging facts are vanishingly slight. They cite language about Americans’ longstanding distrust of parties and partisans, evidencing our willingness to believe outlandish claims about the “other.” The upshot is, with no evidentiary base and no trust of the other side, we’ll willingly believe violent, baseless smears about the opposition.

No shit, Sherlock.

They expound upon that fundamental claim for over 170 pages, often stating the same position multiple ways to ensure we’ve understood their message. They draw examples from talk radio bomb-throwers, Internet message boards, and especially The Former President, who’s clearly the epicenter of their frustration. Before long, readers start feeling the message is exhaustively described, especially if we already fundamentally agree. Sadly, for all the description, it isn’t much explained.

Russell Muirhead, left, and Nancy L. Rosenblum (directory photos)

Moreover, for all their description, our authors frequently overlook important facts that could’ve explained much more. They claim, for instance, that new conspiracists, especially The Former President, fling aspersions and innuendo without much evidence. That’s true enough, if you’re looking for justification from conventional authorities. But that isn’t how these conspiracies actually work. Our authors might’ve realized this, had they given QAnon more than a cursory glance.

In QAnon theory, the supposed source, Q, posts brief, disconnected, gnomic statements on popular internet message boards. Crowds of energized devotees then dedicate countless hours of distributed effort decoding these messages, assigning them meaning, and putting them in order. The narrative still exists, it’s just been crowdsourced. Classical conspiracy theories, like anti-Stratfordianism or ufology, had narratives written by self-appointed experts; new conspiracies entrust the narrative to the masses.

This book was written before the event that solidified this trend: the COVID-19 pandemic. Faced with robust evidence of a terrible disease that would kill the most defenseless, The Former President made unsupported accusations that government agencies, scientists, and universities (our authors’ three favorite sources of truth) were conspiring against his administration. As with all his conspiracies, he provided no evidence, merely confident assertions.

His loyalists flooded YouTube, 8Chan, and the blogosphere, manically fabricating evidence to support his claims. Entire books, vlog channels, and other sources deluged our eyes with untruths, false equivalencies, and misinformation. Most importantly, because (as our authors note) the administration deligitimated the only sources of counterevidence, their narratives couldn’t be disproved.No, The Former President didn’t support his position; he didn’t need to.

That’s where our authors ultimately disappoint: in looking to explain new conspiracism, they don’t just rely on descriptions, they rely on descriptions from official sources. The new conspiracies are ground-level, decentralized, and workaday. They don’t fit scripts accepted in academic PoliSci, which Muirhead and Rosenblum work from. Thus our authors fail to explain what they describe, and describe only what their theories permitted them to see.

I wanted to enjoy this book. Sadly, our authors never overcome their academic blinders.